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Perspective
F
or researchers who operate at 
the intersection of basic biology 
and toxicology, following the 
data where they take you—as any 
good scientist would—carries the 
risk that you will be publicly attacked 
as a crank, charged with scientiﬁ  c 
misconduct, or removed from a 
government scientiﬁ  c review panel. 
Such a fate may seem unthinkable to 
those involved in primary research, but 
it has increasingly become the norm 
for toxicologists and environmental 
investigators. If you ﬁ  nd evidence that 
a compound worth billions of dollars to 
its manufacturer poses a public health 
risk, you will almost certainly ﬁ  nd 
yourself in the middle of a contentious 
battle that has little to do with scientiﬁ  c 
truth (see Box 1). 
The latest example of this trend 
involves decabromobiphenyl ether, 
a polybrominated diphenyl ether 
(PBDE) commonly known as deca. A 
widely used ﬁ  re retardant, deca has 
been brought under close scrutiny 
by a growing number of reports of its 
toxicity. Increased levels of the agent 
have been found in the bodies of 
young children. To respond to this, 
the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) convened a panel of experts in 
2006 to determine the state of risk that 
accompanied its use and appointed 
Deborah Rice to chair the panel of 
outside experts. Rice, who had held an 
appointment as a senior toxicologist at 
the EPA, and who is now a toxicologist 
for the state of Maine, has won wide 
respect for her studies of neurotoxins. 
Indeed, in 2004, the EPA recognized 
her with one of its most prestigious 
scientiﬁ  c awards for “exceptionally 
high-quality research into lead’s 
toxicity” (for information on the award, 
see http://es.epa.gov/ncer/staa/
annual/2004/staa_faq.html). 
Under her chairmanship, the PBDE 
report was completed and submitted 
in February of 2007. The American 
Chemistry Council (ACC), a chemical 
industry trade group, did not elect to 
contest the statements of the report; 
it chose instead to accuse Rice of 
bias against the use of deca and to 
pressure the EPA to dismiss her from 
the panel. In a letter to EPA Assistant 
Administrator for Research and 
Development George Gray on May 
3, 2007, the ACC argued that Rice’s 
appointment represented a conﬂ  ict of 
interest and “might lack the impartiality 
and objectivity necessary to conduct a 
fair and impartial review of the data,” 
based in part on testimony she gave to 
the Maine State Legislature describing 
the dangers of deca-BDE and 
advocating a state mandate to phase out 
its use (for more information on her 
dismissal, see: http://energycommerce.
house.gov/Press_110/110-ltr.031308.
EPA.BPA.pdf) [1].
The EPA, without examining or 
contesting the charge of bias, complied. 
Rice was ﬁ  red. The next formal act 
of the EPA was to remove all of her 
comments from the written report 
and completely erase her name from 
the text of the review. There is now no 
evidence that she ever participated in 
the EPA proceedings, or was even in the 
room. The only indication that another 
reviewer had served on the panel was 
this note in the “revised” report: “Notice: 
EPA modiﬁ  ed this report in August 
2007 to include only four of the ﬁ  ve 
reviewers’ comments. One reviewer’s 
comments were excluded from the 
report and were not considered by EPA 
due to the perception of a potential 
conﬂ  ict of interest.”
In the interests of full disclosure, I 
should say that I have been a friend 
and admirer of Deborah Rice for 
many years. Our friendship extends 
back at least to the late 1970s, when 
we both were studying the toxicity of 
lead at low levels, she in primates at 
the EPA and I in children at Harvard 
Medical School. She is particularly 
memorable to me because she knew 
her stuff and brooked no vagueness or 
dissembling. She moved the leading 
edge of neurotoxicology forward by 
replacing rodents with primates to 
study the behavioral effects of lead [2]. 
Her colony of monkeys was carefully 
maintained until they reached the age 
of 26 years, enabling studies of the 
effects of lead on aging. This alone was 
a heroic effort. Her broad sphere of 
interest combined with an acute and 
critical mind has gained wide respect 
in the toxicology community. She was 
a natural choice as chair of the panel 
examining PBDE.
It appears that some in Congress 
agree. In a March 13 letter to EPA 
Administrator Stephen Johnson, 
Rep. John Dingell, who is overseeing 
a congressional investigation into 
conﬂ  icts of interest in EPA scientiﬁ  c 
review panels, asked why the agency 
would remove Rice as chair of an 
external review panel at the request 
of the chemical industry (http://
energycommerce.house.gov/Press_
110/110-ltr.031308.EPA.BPA.pdf). 
“The ACC does not assert that Rice 
has any pecuniary interest in the 
human health assessment at issue,” 
Dingell writes, “and therefore seems 
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to argue that scientiﬁ  c expertise with 
regard to a particular chemical and 
its human health effects is a basis for 
disqualiﬁ  cation from a peer review 
board. This does not seem sensible on 
its face.” He goes on to argue that the 
EPA’s routine reliance on chemical 
industry employees and representatives 
for scientiﬁ  c review, “together with 
the dismissal of Rice, raises serious 
questions with regard to EPA’s conﬂ  ict 
of interest rules and their application.”
Rice’s experience, like that of so 
many other researchers who ﬁ  nd 
themselves locked in battle with 
industry giants, reveals the inherent 
disconnect between the interests of 
science and those of commerce. The 
scientiﬁ  c community is governed by 
its own rules, codiﬁ  ed in the 1940s 
by Robert Merton, the distinguished 
Columbia University sociologist, as 
four normative standards for scientiﬁ  c 
conduct [3]. Science is universal: the 
rules apply every where to every one. 
Science is communal: the fruits of 
science belong to everyone. Science is 
disinterested: the discoveries of science 
are not affected by personal gain, 
ideology, or any cause but the truth. 
Finally, science is regulated by organized 
skepticism: scientists do not accept the 
claims of a hypothesis unless both 
its methods and evidence have been 
rigorously vetted. The conclusions 
drawn by scientists rely on these 
normative standards. However, these 
criteria do not stand up well in the 
face of the ethos of commerce. There 
is an unavoidable tension between the 
interests of commercial entities fueled 
by corporate proﬁ  t reports and those 
true scientists whose motivation is 
curiosity, peer recognition, and societal 
beneﬁ  t.
Merton’s standards seem to have 
had some force until 1980, when the 
Bayh-Dole Act was passed. This act 
permitted scientists and universities to 
patent their discoveries, and it opened 
the ﬂ  oodgates to ﬁ  nancial interests. 
The ethos of university science 
shifted. It allowed scientists to get rich 
by patenting their discoveries and 
partnering with the private sector while 
being funded by government grants. 
More and more university scientists 
receive varying degrees of industry 
support and increasingly participate 
in regulatory activity. I realized this 
when I was appointed to an EPA 
advisory panel on human testing with 
pesticides. The chairman was a former 
EPA scientist who left the agency to 
start a commercial ﬁ  rm to test pesticide 
toxicity. The majority of members on 
that panel had some connection to 
industry. It was easy to identify most 
of those members who had industrial 
sponsorship by the tendentious quality 
of their arguments. 
This disparity in values is displayed 
in clear relief in the Deborah Rice case. 
This is not to say that scientists are 
oblivious to the attraction of money. 
But it used to be that most people who 
opted for a career in the laboratory 
understood that they were accepting a 
Herbert Needleman is no stranger to 
the smear tactics of industry. Needleman, 
a professor of psychiatry and pediatrics 
at the University of Pittsburgh, began 
to document the health effects of 
low lead exposure in the early 1970s. 
His groundbreaking work—which 
industry fought tooth and nail—clearly 
demonstrated lead’s toxic effects on 
children, providing critical evidence 
for regulations to eliminate lead from 
gasoline and interior paints, and to lower 
the blood lead standard for children. 
Concerned that blood lead levels in 
an older child would not reﬂ  ect early 
exposures, Needleman developed a 
method to evaluate discarded baby 
teeth (both teeth and bone accumulate 
lead) for a more accurate history of past 
lead exposure. He found that inner-city 
children had higher lead levels than 
children living in the suburbs, even 
though none of the children showed 
signs of lead poisoning [5]. When 
Needleman presented his ﬁ  ndings at 
a 1972 meeting of lead researchers, he 
was surprised by the venomous nature 
of attacks by industry scientists leveled 
at any researcher who dared present 
evidence that lead could cause harm at 
low doses.
Needleman continued his work and 
found that children with elevated tooth 
lead levels scored lower on a suite of 
cognitive tests measuring IQ, speech, 
and language skills. He published 
his results in a 1979 landmark study 
showing that early childhood exposure 
to low levels of lead could compromise 
a child’s intellectual performance and 
behavior, again, without evidence of 
lead poisoning [6,7]. Six months later, 
Needleman received a call from a 
representative at the International Lead 
Zinc Research Organization, a nonproﬁ  t 
trade organization that conducts 
research on behalf of the lead and zinc 
industry, asking for his data. He declined.
The attacks began soon after, starting 
with a Pediatrics paper criticizing 
Needleman’s 1979 study [8], followed 
by charges that the work was ﬂ  awed 
in testimony before the EPA [9]. After 
reviewing the charges and original work, 
the EPA conﬁ  rmed Needleman’s ﬁ  ndings 
[10]. Then, in 1991, two psychologists 
who provided expert testimony on behalf 
of the tetraethyl lead industry accused 
Needleman of scientiﬁ  c misconduct. One 
of the psychologists, Claire Ernhart, had 
written the critical Pediatrics paper and 
testiﬁ  ed against his study before the EPA. 
The attorney who ﬁ  led the complaint 
with the NIH Ofﬁ  ce of Research Integrity 
worked for a ﬁ  rm with links to the Ethyl 
Corporation of America, the major 
manufacturer of tetraethyl lead. 
The University of Pittsburgh Medical 
School began a preliminary investigation 
of the charges, but denied Needleman’s 
request for open hearings. Needleman 
sought the support of the faculty 
assembly, which unanimously voted 
for open hearings, ﬁ  led a complaint in 
federal court, and had the support of 
400 independent scientists calling on 
the chancellor to open the hearings. 
The university acceded. After a 2-day 
hearing, and months of deliberation, 
the committee released a unanimous 
decision: there was no evidence of 
scientiﬁ  c misconduct [11]. Thanks to 
Needleman’s pioneering efforts to reduce 
the hazards of lead [7], average blood 
lead levels of children in the United 
States dropped an estimated 78% from 
1976 to 1991 (http://www.hhs.gov/asl/
testify/t960501b.html). Whether other 
defenders of public health will be spared 
a similar path may ultimately depend 
on stronger laws to safeguard scientiﬁ  c 
integrity—and public health—from the 
undue inﬂ  uence of industry. 
Box 1. A Battle-Tested Veteran in the Fight for Scientiﬁ  c Integrity
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modest lifestyle. Industry scientists have 
a different value system. Faced with a 
critical report by the deca panel, the 
ﬁ  rst response of the bromine industry 
was to protect their bottom line and get 
Rice ﬁ  red. The EPA, whose reputation 
for independence is not enviable, 
saluted and not only ejected Rice, 
but also eliminated any trace of her 
contribution. Does this strike a familiar 
note? Some notorious undemocratic 
regimes have cleansed history and 
science when the truth did not serve 
their purposes. One is reminded of the 
rewriting of history during the Stalin 
regime.
The newspapers regularly detail 
examples of EPA cupidity. As I write 
this, today’s New York Times (March 
13, 2008) carries this story: “The 
Environmental Protection Agency 
announced a modest tightening 
of the smog standard… overruling 
the unanimous advice of its science 
advisory council for a more protective 
standard.” [4]. And so it goes.
I recite this sordid affair because 
it displays the ethical insouciance of 
industry, and of those PhDs who wear 
the caps and gowns of the academy, 
while they embrace the mores of the 
marketplace. 
Deborah Rice is widely admired by 
her colleagues for her intelligence, 
integrity, and moral compass. She will 
withstand this insult and continue 
to contribute to the public welfare. 
Science and public health badly need 
more people like her.  
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